The U.S. oversight system for genetically engineered organisms was evaluated to develop hypotheses and derive lessons for oversight of other emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology. Evaluation was based upon quantitative expert elicitation, semi-standardized interviews, and historical literature analysis. Through an interdisciplinary policy analysis approach, blending legal, ethical, risk analysis, and policy sciences viewpoints, criteria were used to identify strengths and weaknesses of GEOs oversight and explore correlations among its attributes and outcomes. From the three sources of data, hypotheses and broader (...) conclusions for oversight were developed. Our analysis suggests several lessons for oversight of emerging technologies: the importance of reducing complexity and uncertainty in oversight for minimizing financial burdens on small product developers; consolidating multi-agency jurisdictions to avoid gaps and redundancies in safety reviews; consumer benefits for advancing acceptance of GEO products; rigorous and independent pre- and post-market assessment for environmental safety; early public input and transparency for ensuring public confidence; and the positive role of public input in system development, informed consent, capacity, compliance, incentives, and data requirements and stringency in promoting health and environmental safety outcomes, as well as the equitable distribution of health impacts. Our integrated approach is instructive for more comprehensive analyses of oversight systems, developing hypotheses for how features of oversight systems affect outcomes, and formulating policy options for oversight of future technological products, especially nanotechnology products. (shrink)

U.S. approaches to oversight of research and technological products have developed over time in an effort to ensure safety to humans, animals, and the environment and to control use in a social context. In modern times, regulatory and oversight tools have evolved to include diverse approaches such as performance standards, tradable allowances, consultations between government and industry, and pre-market safety and efficacy reviews. The decision whether to impose an oversight system, the oversight elements, the level of oversight, the choice of (...) approach, and its execution can profoundly affect technological development, individual and collective interests, and public confidence in technological products. Oversight is conducted by a range of institutions with various capabilities, cultures, and motives. Avenues for disputing oversight decisions are also important, and some argue that the U.S. operates in an adversarial regulatory culture in which Congress, the media, and stakeholders regularly contest the decisions of federal agencies. (shrink)

Mentoring Away the Glass Ceiling in Academia: A Cultured Critique describes how women of diverse backgrounds perceive their mentoring experiences or the lack of mentoring experiences in the academy. This book provides a space for envisioning strategies and practices to improve mentoring practices and the collegiate environment.

Avant le début des années 1990, les héroïnes étaient souvent considérées comme des versions affadies d’une catégorie générique bien plus glorieuse, celle des héros grecs. A la limite l’héroïsme ne se pensait même pas au féminin. Depuis, deux livres ont corrigé la perspective en faisant valoir l’importance des cultes dirigés vers des personnages féminins tout en tentant de souligner les spécificités de ce type d’héroïsme en Grèce ancienne. En choisissant de travailler sur les héroïnes cultuell...

Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics (...) then is involved with questions of moral psychology whose answers admit a kind of richness in the life of human beings from which the philosophy of mind may ordinarily prescind. Philosophy of mind, insofar as it treats the phenomenon of agency as one facet of the phenomenon of mentality, has been more concerned with how there can be ‘mental causation’ than with any details of a story of human motivation or of the place of evaluative commitments within such a story. (shrink)

Introduction -- Elucidating complexity theories -- Complexity in the natural sciences -- Complexity in social theory -- Towards transdisciplinarity -- Complexity in philosophy: complexification and the limits to knowledge -- Complexity in ethics -- Earth in the anthropocene -- Complexity and climate change -- American dreams, ecological nightmares and new visions -- Complexity and sustainability: wicked problems, gordian knots and synergistic solutions -- Conclusion.

A framework for understanding the complex movements of mitosis and meiosis has been provided by the recent discovery of microtubule motor proteins, required for the proper distribution of chromosomes or the structural integrity of the mitotic or meiotic spindle. Although overall features of mitosis and meiosis are often assumed to be similar in mechanism, it is now clear that they differ in several important aspects. These include spindle structure and assembly, and timing of chromosome segregation to opposite poles. Here we (...) review progress in the functional characterization of several newly identified microtubule motor proteins, emphasizing their possible roles in spindle structure and function. (shrink)

Though largely unknown today, “Ned Buntline” (Edward Zane Carroll Judson) was one of the most influential authors of 19th-century America. He published over 170 novels, edited multiple popular and political publications, and helped pioneer the seafaring adventure, city mystery and Western genres. It was his pirate tales that Tom Sawyer constantly reenacted, his “Bowery B’hoys” that came to define the distinctive slang and swagger of urban American characters, and his novels and plays that turned an unknown scout into Buffalo Bill, (...) King of the Border Men. But before “Ned Buntline” became a mainstay of the popular press, he had been on his way to becoming one of the nation’s highbrow literary elites. He was praised by the leading critics, edited an important literary journal, and his stories appeared in the era’s most prestigious publications. This study examines how and why “Ned Buntline” moved from prestigious to popular authorship and argues that the transformation was precipitated by one very specific event: in 1846, Edward Z. C. Judson was lynched. A close examination of Judson’s life, writing, and the coverage of him in the newspapers of the day (including the remarkable story of how he survived a lynching) demonstrates that the same issues that led to his lynching also led to his rebirth as a new kind of American author. (shrink)

In any attempt to present an overview of the conceptions of reality and divinity in classical Indian (Hindu) civilization, it is helpful, first of all, to highlight some of the basic cultural and intellectual presuppositions that appear to be operative in classical Indian thought (which, for the purposes of this article, will be taken as consisting of the so‐called six classical schools of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Advaita Vedānta during the classical period, from the first centuries of the (...) Common Era up to the coming of Islamic traditions in the eleventh century). This can be accomplished in various ways, but perhaps the simplest way is to articulate some basic questions to which classical Indian thought provides some interesting, albeit unusual, answers. The questions can be framed as follows: (1) What truly is? (2) How does one know what truly is? (3) Who knows what truly is? (4) With whom does one know what truly is? And, finally: (5) What does God have to do with what truly is? The questions have to do, respectively, with (1) ontology, (2) epistemology, (3) psychology, (4) social anthropology, and (5) theology. Classical Indian thought, of course, provides a variety of answers to all of these questions, and there was much vigorous debate and polemic through the centuries about precisely how to form satisfactory answers. Generally speaking, however, it appears to be the case that the classical Indian philosophical schools tended to deal with these basic questions in a manner quite different from the way these questions have been dealt with in traditional or modern Western thought, and it is important to understand some of these differences if one wishes to appreciate the unique conceptual frameworks in classical Indian thought. (shrink)

Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this (...) thesis is false and, hence, that the literature on testimony has been shaped at its core by a view that is fundamentally misguided. She then defends a detailed alternative to this conception of testimony: whereas the views currently dominant focus on the epistemic status of what speakers believe, Lackey advances a theory that instead centers on what speakers say. The upshot is that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another's beliefs - we learn from one another's words. Once this shift in focus is in place, Lackey goes on to argue that, though positive reasons are necessary for testimonial knowledge, testimony itself is an irreducible epistemic source. This leads to the development of a theory that gives proper credence to testimony's epistemologically dual nature: both the speaker and the hearer must make a positive epistemic contribution to testimonial knowledge. The resulting view not only reveals that testimony has the capacity to generate knowledge, but it also gives appropriate weight to our nature as both socially indebted and individually rational creatures. The approach found in this book will, then, represent a radical departure from the views currently dominating the epistemology of testimony, and thus is intended to reshape our understanding of the deep and ubiquitous reliance we have on the testimony of those around us. (shrink)

Background:The public domain of midwifery practice, represented by the educational and hospital institutions could be blamed for a subconscious ethical dilemma for midwifery practitioners. The result of such tension can be seen in complaints from maternity service users of dehumanised care. When expectations are not met, women report dehumanising experiences that carry long term consequences to both them and their child.Objectives:To revisit the ethical foundation of midwifery practice to reflect the feminist Ethic of Care and reframe what is valuable to (...) women and midwives during the childbirth experience.Research Design:A comprehensive literature review is presented from the midwifery and feminist ethics discourse.Ethical Considerations:Nil to report.Findings:Women are vulnerable during childbirth as they need care, yet they prioritise elements of relationship in their experience. The Ethic of Care approach equalises the relationship between the midwife and the woman, providing the space for relationship building and allowing midwives to meet the expectations of their accepted responsibility.Discussion:Some midwives manage to balance the demands of the institution with the needs of the woman. This is described as both an emotional and professionally challenging balancing act.Conclusion:Until there is a formal acknowledgement of the different ethical approach to midwifery practice from within the profession and the Institution, midwifery identity and practice will continue to be compromised. (shrink)

Countable homogeneous relational structures have been studied by many people. One area of focus is the Ramsey theory of such structures. After a review of background material, a partition theorem of Laflamme, Sauer, and Vuksanovic for countable homogeneous binary relational structures is discussed with a focus on the size of the set of unavoidable colors.

Dispositionality is a modal notion of a certain sort. When an object is said to have a disposition, we typically understand this to mean that under certain circumstances, the object would behave in a certain way. For instance, a fragile object is disposed to break when dropped onto a concrete surface. It need not actually break - its being fragile has implications that, so to speak, point beyond the actual world. According to dispositionalism, all modal features of the world may (...) be accounted for in terms of its dispositional features. My aim in this paper is to assess the prospects for dispositionalism by examining the most promising theories. Sections 1 and 2 clarify the assumptions and desiderata of a successful dispositionalist theory of modality. Section 3 introduces the principles governing the dispositionalist theories that apparently meet the desiderata. Sections 4 through 6 show that dispositionalism nonetheless faces three problems: while dispositions help account for modal features of the world that are local, diachronic, or gradable, they cannot account for certain modal features of the world that are global, synchronic, or absolute. I end by discussing the costs of preserving dispositionalism. (shrink)

1. Lying -- 2. The problem of what is said -- 3. What is said -- 4. Is lying worse than merely misleading? -- 5. Some interesting cases.

We present a variety of (ω 1 ,∞)-distributive forcings which when applied to models of Martin's Maximum separate certain well known reflection principles. In particular, we do this for the reflection principles SR, SR α (α ≤ ω 1 ), and SRP.

Ethical codes have been hailed as an explicit vehicle for achieving more sustainable and defensible organizational practice. Nonetheless, when legal compliance and corporate governance codes are conflated, codes can be used to define organizational interests ostentatiously by stipulating norms for employee ethics. Such codes have a largely cosmetic and insurance function, acting subtly and strategically to control organizational risk management and protection. In this paper, we conduct a genealogical discourse analysis of a representative code of ethics from an international corporation (...) to understand how management frames expectations of compliance. Our contribution is to articulate the problems inherent in codes of ethics, and we make some recommendations to address these to benefit both an organization and its employees. In this way, we show how a code of ethics can provide a foundation for ethical sustainability, while addressing management intentions and employees’ ethical satisfaction. (shrink)

There is a puzzle concerning the essences of fundamental entities that arises from considerations about essence, on one hand, and fundamentality, on the other. The Essence-Dependence Link (EDL) says that if x figures in the essence of y, then y is dependent upon x. EDL is prima facie plausible in many cases, especially those involving derivative entities. But consider the property negative charge. A negatively charged object exhibits certain behaviors that a positively charged object does not: it moves away from (...) other negatively charged objects, towards positively charged objects, etc. It is commonly thought that negative charge disposes its bearer to move away from other negatively charged objects, towards positively charged objects, etc. But if negative charge is fundamental, then no other entities—including the property positive charge—can figure in its essence. We thus have a prima facie puzzle: How can we say anything interesting about the essences of fundamental entities without running afoul of EDL? In this paper, I present and discuss the consequences of EDL for the debate between causal essentialists and quidditists about properties, and propose solutions to the puzzle. (shrink)

Properties seem to play an important role in causal relations. But philosophers disagree over whether or not properties play their causal or nomic roles essentially. Causal essentialists say that they do, while quidditists deny it. This article surveys these two views, as well as views that try to find a middle ground.

ABSTRACT:The primacy of shareholder demands in the traditional theory of the firm has typically excluded marginalised stakeholder voices. However, shareholders involved in social shareholder engagement (SSE) purport to bring these voices into corporate decision-making. In response to ethical concerns about the legitimacy of SSE, we use the lens of discourse ethics to provide a normative analysis at both action and constitutional levels. By specifying three normative questions, we extend the analysis of SSE to identify a political role for shareholders in (...) pursuit of the common good. We demonstrate the desirability for SSE to promote regulatory/institutional change to guarantee marginalised stakeholders a voice in corporate decisions that affect them. The theory of SSE we propose thus calls into question the stark separation of the political and economic spheres and reveals an underlying tension, often overlooked, within the responsible investment literature. (shrink)

Jennifer Lackey presents a ground-breaking exploration of the epistemology of groups, and its implications for group agency and responsibility. She argues that group belief and knowledge depend on what individual group members do or are capable of doing, while being subject to group-level normative requirements.

This essay explores the speech act of dogwhistling (sometimes referred to as ‘using coded language’). Dogwhistles may be overt or covert, and within each of these categories may be intentional or unintentional. Dogwhistles are a powerful form of political speech, allowing people to be manipulated in ways they would resist if the manipulation was carried outmore openly—often drawing on racist attitudes that are consciously rejected. If philosophers focus only on content expressed or otherwise consciously conveyed they may miss what is (...) most powerful and pernicious in the speech of political culture. This essay is a call to start paying attention to these more covert speech acts, and a first attempt at beginning to theorize them. It argues that dogwhistles present a complex and interesting case for the philosopher of language, and explores their implications for democratic politics. (shrink)

There is a widely accepted family of views in the epistemology of testimony centering around the claim that belief is the central item involved in a testimonial exchange. For instance, in describing the process of learning via testimony, Elizabeth Fricker provides the following: “one language-user has a belief, which gives rise to an utterance by him; as a result of observing this utterance another user of the same language, his audience, comes to share that belief.” In a similar spirit, Alvin (...) Plantinga says that “…a belief on the part of the testifiee has warrant only if that belief has warrant for the testifier.” In both of these passages, we find strands of what I shall call the Belief View of Testimony. (shrink)

A view of knowledge—what I call the "Deserving Credit View of Knowledge" —found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it (...) is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit. (shrink)

Hurley’s is a difficult book to work through—partly because of its length and the complexity of its arguments, but also because each of the ten essays of which it is composed has a rather different starting point and focus, and because few of her arguments achieve real closure. Essay 2 discusses competing interpretations of Kant, essay 4 articulates nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness, essay 5 offers fresh interpretations of commissurotomy patients’ behavior, essay 6 develops an objection to Wittgenstein on rule following, (...) essay 8 attacks an alleged assumption of externalism, and chapter 10 explores the possibility of combining a “motor theory” and a “control theory” of perception. This is a very rich brew, and at least half the challenge this book presents consists in discerning its central argument and conclusion with enough precision to bring criticism to bear. (shrink)

Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like:1. Lois believes that Superman can flywithout a change in truth value. In an earlier paper, Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity-producing conditions existed, such as:2. Superman leaps (...) more tall buildings than Clark Kent does.Accounts focusing on opacity were unable to explain our ‘anti-substitution intuitions’ in such cases.In Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, Saul extends her earlier work. She provides a comprehensive presentation and criticism of recent accounts of simple sentence substitution failure, and proposes a new approach drawing on psychological evidence about cognitive processing. Saul's purpose is not merely to solve the substitution puzzle cases, but to make …. (shrink)

Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith (...) Lehrer, Richard Moran, Frederick F. Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve. (shrink)

The Filter Dichotomy says that every uniform nonmeager filter on the integers is mapped by a finite-to-one function to an ultrafilter. The consistency of this principle was proved by Blass and Laflamme. A medial limit is a universally measurable function from [Formula: see text] to the unit interval [0, 1] which is finitely additive for disjoint sets, and maps singletons to 0 and ω to 1. Christensen and Mokobodzki independently showed that the Continuum Hypothesis implies the existence of medial limits. (...) We show that the Filter Dichotomy implies that there are no medial limits. (shrink)

The forcing construction Pmax, invented by W. Hugh Woodin, produces a model whose collection of subsets of ω₁ is in some sense maximal. In this paper we study the Boolean algebra induced by the nonstationary ideal on ω₁ in this model. Among other things we show that the induced quotient does not have a simply definable form. We also prove several results about saturation properties of the ideal in this extension.

Actualist counterpart theory replaces David Lewis’s concrete possible worlds and individuals with ersatz worlds and individuals, but retains counterpart theory about de re modality. While intuitively attractive, this view has been rejected for two main reasons: the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. I argue that in insisting that ersatz individuals play the same role as Lewisian individuals, actualists commit the particularist fallacy. The actualist should not require stand-ins for every Lewisian individual. Ersatz individuals should instead be construed as (...) representations of actually existing qualitative ways for individuals to be, or qualitative properties individuals can instantiate. This necessitates changes elsewhere. Non-instrumental uses of Kripke semantics and standard counterpart semantics also require stand-ins for particular non-actual individuals. I argue that the actualist should instead adopt a non-standard counterpart semantics that more clearly illuminates the role that actual properties and relations play in explaining de re possibilities and necessities. The result is an intuitive and forceful reply to both the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. (shrink)